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SWIPE FREEZE: HOW THE “DURBIN AMENDMENT”
IS PREVENTING YOUR MOBILE PHONE FROM
REPLACING YOUR WALLET

INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2010, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank or Act) to “promote the financial stability of the United States” through increased
financial regulation.1 The Act is a sprawling, catchall regulation for
financial reform, the full scope of which remains unclear. Despite the
complexity of the Act, one amendment provided a regulation that
was, on its surface, very straightforward. The so-called Durbin
Amendment (Amendment), sponsored by Senator Richard Durbin,
tasked the newly formed Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Board) with making the fee charged to a merchant for a debit
transaction “reasonable and proportional” to the actual cost incurred
by the card issuer.2 Additionally, the Amendment provides that each
debit card must be capable of processing payments on at least two
different networks, such as Visa and MasterCard.3 Commentators reacted to the inclusion of the Durbin Amendment with equal parts adoration and abhorrence, though they universally overlooked its effect
on the blossoming mobile-payment industry.
It should come as no surprise that the U.S. marketplace is increasingly capable of processing payments directly from a consumer’s mobile phone. As of February 2012, 49% of U.S. mobile subscribers
owned smartphones.4 Moreover, technological advances have made it
possible for consumers to integrate their finances directly into their
phones, prompting one writer to ask, “How long before we could get
by using just our smartphones as our wallets?”5 She found that, al1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2012).
3. Id. § 1693o-2(b)(1)(A).
4. Smartphones Account for Half of All Mobile Phones, Dominate New Phone Purchases in
the US, NIELSON (March 29, 2012) [hereinafter NIELSON, Smartphones], http://www.nielsen.com/
us/en/newswire/2012/smartphones-account-for-half-of-all-mobile-phones-dominate-new-phonepurchases-in-the-us.html.
5. Christina Bonnington, My Walletless Month: Happier, Healthier, and Ready to Ditch Cash
Forever, WIRED (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/10/one-month-of-wallet
less/all/.
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though we are progressing toward making our wallets obsolete, a completely “walletless” life is still many years away.6 Still, the advent of
mobile payments is not all that recent. In 2004 the U.S. market for
mobile payment at the physical point of sale was already beginning to
emerge, and by the end of 2004 the global market for mobile commerce and e-payments totaled $200 billion.7 Outside of the United
States, pilot programs have demonstrated that consumers highly value
the convenience of mobile payment at the physical point of sale.8 Indeed, that convenience is equally valuable to merchants. One industry analyst remarked that “if [merchants] can shave 10 seconds off
wait times, same-store sales could go up a lot . . . . It’s substantial.”9
Unfortunately, one modest amendment to Dodd–Frank threatens
to derail the expansion of the mobile-payment industry. This Comment discusses how Dodd–Frank will ultimately impede the burgeoning technologies necessary to make mobile payments more
accessible. Specifically, it analyzes the Amendment’s unintended impact on the mobile-payment industry and demonstrates why the provision should be amended to provide a mobile-payment exception.
Part II of this Comment discusses the events leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent passage of Dodd–Frank, as well
as the relevant provisions of the Amendment.10 Additionally, Part II
examines the relatively new field of mobile payments by detailing the
specific technology employed by mobile-payment platforms and the
major players in the industry.11 Part III analyzes the interplay between the Amendment and the mobile-payment industry and argues
that the Amendment’s drafters overlooked its constraining effect on
the industry.12 This Comment makes two arguments to support that
contention. First, by cutting into card-issuer revenues, the Amendment disincentivizes investment in the fledgling mobile-payment market, where merchants are unable or unwilling to provide the necessary
infrastructure.13 Second, the interchange-fee regulation and two-network requirement have the anticompetitive effect of blocking new
6. Id.
7. SMART CARD ALLIANCE, MOBILE PAYMENTS AT THE PHYSICAL POINT-OF-SALE: ASSESSING U.S. MARKET DRIVERS AND INDUSTRY DIRECTION 5 (2005), available at http://www.it.iitb.ac
.in/~tijo/seminar/Mobile_Payments_Physical_POS.pdf.
8. Id. at 6.
9. Alistair Barr, PayPal Could Heat Up Mobile Payments Race if McDonald’s Test Pays Off,
REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/17/us-paypal-mcdonalds-idUS
BRE87G0ZB20120817.
10. See infra notes 16–57 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 58–128 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 129–211 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 129–202 and accompanying text.
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market entrants that would otherwise have priced their interchange
fee lower than the industry giants.14 Finally, Part IV discusses the
overall impact of the Amendment on the implementation of electronic
payments and advocates for the addition of a mobile-payment exception to the Amendment.15
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The 2008 Financial Crisis and Congress’s Response
Beginning in 2008, the United States endured a financial crisis—one
later characterized as the worst since the Great Depression16—during
which $17 trillion worth of personal savings was lost.17 From 2008 to
2009 alone, 8.3 million American jobs were eliminated.18 The situation prompted then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson to call
together congressional leaders and proclaim that unless they acted,
“the financial system of this country and the world [would] melt down
in a matter of days.”19 The crisis initially triggered two pieces of reactive legislation aimed at controlling the effects of the recession.20 The
first, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,21 made $700
billion available for government purchase of toxic mortgage assets.22
The second, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,23
was a $787 billion stimulus bill designed to curb the recession and associated job losses.24 However, these bills did little to silence the demands for increased financial regulation going forward. A New York
Times editorial demanded a complete overhaul of the financial indus14. See infra notes 203–211 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 212–252 and accompanying text.
16. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the
Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 953 (2011) (quoting Angela Maddaloni & JoséLuis Peydró, Bank Risk-Taking, Securitization, Supervision and Low Interest Rates: Evidence
from the Euro Area and the U.S. Lending Standards 7 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper
No. 1248, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1679689).
17. Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory Reform: Strengths,
Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 182
(2012).
18. Id. (citing FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 390 (2011)).
19. Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:
What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd–Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV.
1243, 1244–45 (2011) (citing Frontline: Inside the Meltdown (PBS television broadcast Feb. 17,
2009), available at http://video.pbs.org/video/1082087546).
20. Id. at 1246.
21. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.
22. Murdock, supra note 19, at 1245.
23. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
24. Murdock, supra note 19, at 1245.
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try’s regulatory structure, stating that “[a]nything less than a new
rules-based regime would be inadequate to the task of restoring confidence and, eventually, reviving the economy.”25 A similar sentiment
was echoed during the 2008 U.S. congressional hearings before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.26
The result was a third piece of legislation, the Dodd–Frank Act,
signed into law on July 21, 2010.27 Dodd–Frank was aimed squarely at
preventing future crises.28 President Obama pledged that the Act
would
rein in the abuse and excess that nearly brought down our financial
system [and] bring transparency to the kinds of complex and risky
transactions that helped trigger the financial crisis . . . . [T]he American people will never again be asked to foot the bill for Wall
Street’s mistakes.29

Dodd–Frank marked “the largest financial industry reform package
since the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.”30 Although Congress
passed Dodd–Frank as an 848-page document, it had ballooned to
8,843 pages by its two-year anniversary and still contained less than
one-third of its required rulemaking.31 Dodd–Frank’s breadth was
seemingly endless: for example, it created a council of regulators to
monitor the state of the economy, an agency to regulate consumer
financial products, and new regulations directed towards derivatives
trading.32 Proponents of the Act praise its all-inclusiveness and claim
that it places regulators in the best position to prevent future crises.33
25. Ludwig, supra note 17, at 183 (alteration in original) (quoting Editorial, Starting the Regulatory Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, at A30).
26. See id. (citing Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Genesis of the Current Economic
Crisis: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 56–65
(2008) (statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Chief Executive Officer, Promontory Financial Group)
(“The real question is how far do we go in terms of regulating the financial system . . . . [W]e
have to massively change how we have been regulating and supervising. We have to take better
control of the revolutions in technology and globalization.”)).
27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
28. Murdock, supra note 19, at 1246.
29. Id. at 1247 (quoting President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wallstreet-reform-and-consumer-protection-act)).
30. Cody Vitello, The Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 and What It Means for Joe and Jane
Consumer, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 99 (2010).
31. Dodd-Frank Progress Report, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP 4 (July 18, 2012), http://
www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/FIG/071812_Dodd.Frank.Progress.Report.pdf.
32. Jessica Luhrs, Note, Encouraging Litigation: Why Dodd-Frank Goes Too Far in Eliminating the Procedural Difficulties in Sarbanes-Oxley, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 175, 175–76 (2012).
33. See id. at 176.
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However, the Act has also been met by quite a bit of dissension.
Representative John Boehner called Dodd–Frank “just another biggovernment power grab,” and Representative Michele Bachmann introduced a bill to repeal it altogether.34 Another critic has described it
as “a train wreck,” “legislative gibberish,” and “a betrayal of New
Deal progressive ideals that served this country well.”35 While regulators continue to implement Dodd–Frank’s provisions, the consequences of the Act are not yet fully understood.
B. The Durbin Amendment
One particularly controversial section of Dodd–Frank is a last-minute addition known as the Durbin Amendment. The irony of the controversy surrounding the Amendment is that its provisions are simple
in comparison to nearly every other section of Dodd–Frank. The
Amendment’s stated purpose was to “help small businesses,
merchants, and consumers by providing relief from high interchange
fees for debit card transactions.”36 Interchange fees—which averaged
forty-four cents in 201037— are the costs paid by a merchant to a card
issuer (e.g., Visa or MasterCard) for each debit transaction processed
by the merchant.38 The fee “compensates an issuer for its involvement in an electronic debit transaction.”39 Senator Durbin believed
that the interchange system was “entirely unregulated,” with “no competition and no recourse for merchants exploited by the rate structures and fees.”40 Thus, the Amendment charged the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System with the task of setting the
interchange fee for electronic debit transactions at a level that was
“reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer.”41
34. Murdock, supra note 19, at 1247.
35. Cornelius K. Hurley, Book Review, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2011, at 40 (reviewing
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011)).
36. M. Pierce Sandwith, Note, Debit Card Interchange Fees and the Durbin Amendment’s
Small Bank Exemption, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 223, 232–33 (2012) (quoting 156 CONG. REC.
S3695 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin)).
37. Id. at 224.
38. 12 C.F.R. § 235.2(j) (2012).
39. Id.
40. Sandwith, supra note 36, at 223 (quoting Letter from Senator Richard J. Durbin, U.S.
Senate, to Camden Fine, President and CEO, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., and Dan Mica,
President and CEO, Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n (June 11, 2010), available at http://durbin.senate
.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=d9c42bd5-b945-4bee-b025-55aab2fd586a).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2012).
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Accordingly, the Board requested comment on two alternative standards for determining the new cost of interchange fees.42 The first
alternative, an “issuer-specific standard,” mandated that the interchange fee could not exceed each individual issuer’s allowable costs
and imposed a ceiling of twelve cents.43 The second alternative, a
stand-alone cap, recommended a uniform fee of twelve cents regardless of the issuer’s costs.44 The Board’s final rule adopted a variation
of the latter proposal that set the cap at twenty-one cents per transaction.45 The Amendment also required that all payment cards be capable of processing on at least two networks.46 This provision allows the
merchant to select the least expensive network and process the transaction with that provider.47
The manner in which the Amendment was enacted was highly controversial. The subject of debit interchange was a commonly
researched and debated topic, even before the Amendment was introduced. Debit interchange was the focus of numerous studies, House
and Senate committee hearings, and a large amount of academic literature.48 Still, “not a single syllable can be located” in any of those
materials that addresses the Amendment’s specific interchange ceiling.49 In fact, during his floor speech, Senator Durbin “relied on the
42. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,726 (proposed Dec. 28,
2010).
43. Id. The issuer’s allowable costs are costs “attributable to the issuer’s role in authorization,
clearance, and settlement of the transaction.” Id. The issuer would add up all allowable costs
from its debit transactions over a calendar year and divide that by the number of debit transactions in that year to calculate its interchange fee. Id.
44. Id.
45. 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1) (2012). Thousands of retailers challenged the Board’s twenty-one
cent interchange fee, asserting that it was set too high. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, NACS
v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 11-02075 (RJL), 2013 WL 3943489 (D.D.C. July
31, 2013) (No. 11-2075). On July 31, 2013, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia invalidated the interchange fee, holding that the Board set the fee too high by impermissibly accounting for costs that Dodd-Frank precluded the Board from considering. NACS,
2013 WL 3943489, at *17. However, as of this Comment’s publication, the Board is appealing
that decision. Michael R. Crittenden, Judge Agrees to Delay Ruling on Debit-Card Fees, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732380820457908716
0027260166. The appellate court stayed the district court’s decision and allowed the fee to remain at its current level, pending resolution of the appeal. Id. The court’s schedule requires
briefs to be filed in December of 2013, so a final determination will not likely come until 2014, or
perhaps longer. Id.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(1)(A).
47. Todd Zywicki, Durbin’s Innovation Killer, AMERICAN (June 11, 2010), http://www.ameri
can.com/archive/2011/june/durbin2019s-innovation-killer/.
48. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Paradox of the Durbin Amendment: How Monopolies are Offered Constitutional Protections Denied to Competitive Firms, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1307,
1325 (2011).
49. Id.
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private statements of the head of a major corporation . . . [who attested] that interchange fees were too high because they were the
fourth largest item on the corporation’s books.”50 The Senate voted
for the Amendment’s inclusion only three days after it was
introduced.51
The Amendment’s small-bank exemption is indicative of the bizarre
circumstances leading to its approval. Senator Durbin’s original proposal lacked sufficient votes, prompting him to add a small-bank exemption for those with assets of less than $1 billion.52 In order to
build support for the Amendment, Senator Durbin hand-wrote edits
in the margins of the bill that made exceptions for smaller financial
institutions.53 When the bill again came up short, he revised the exemption ceiling to $10 billion, and it finally passed.54 These circumstances have sparked broad skepticism regarding whether the
Amendment’s enactment was the product of political posturing.55
Given the Amendment’s last-minute inclusion, and its absence from
the original House version, the House did not have an opportunity to
review the Amendment.56 Shortly after the vote, 131 bipartisan members of Congress wrote a letter voicing their “grave concerns” about
the inclusion of the Amendment.57
C. Mobile Payments
A 2010 Federal Reserve study of the most popular noncash methods of payment found that debit cards were the most prevalent, accounting for nearly 35% of all noncash payments.58 Further,
interchange fees from debit transactions in 2009 netted $16.2 billion in
revenue for banks.59 Increased debit card use has coincided with an
50. Id.
51. Durbin Amendment, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS COALITION, http://www.electronicpaymentscoalition.org/key-issues/durbin-amendment/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
52. Epstein, supra note 48, at 1326.
53. Durbin Amendment, supra note 51.
54. Epstein, supra note 48, at 1326.
55. See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, Economic Uncertainty, the Courts, and the Rule of Law, 35 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 203–05 (2012); Thomas McGarity, Administrative Law as a Blood Sport:
Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1693 (2012).
56. Durbin Amendment, supra note 51.
57. Id. (citing Letter from Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz et al., U.S. House of Representatives, to Conferees (June 16, 2010), available at http://wassermanschultz.house.gov/legislation/
Interchange%20Letter%20to%20Conferees%20with%20Signatures.pdf).
58. FED. RESERVE SYS., THE 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY: NONCASH PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006-2009 16 (2011), available at http://www.frbservices
.org/files/communications/pdf/press/2010_payments_study.pdf.
59. Debit Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,397 (July 20, 2011) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235 (2012)).

130

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:123

explosion of smartphone use in this country.60 In fact, smartphones
are replacing an increasing number of everyday items, including alarm
clocks, watches, cameras, and laptop computers.61 Perhaps most telling is that smartphone users spend on average more than two hours
per day using their devices.62 These technological trends are consistent with those in the mobile-banking industry. A March 2011 survey
found that nearly one in five Americans with both a bank account and
a mobile phone had used his or her phone to conduct banking with a
financial institution within the previous ninety days.63 Clearly, the infrastructure is in place for mobile payments to succeed.
1. Technological Overview of Mobile Payments
Experts estimate that since 2010 about five billion people worldwide have logged mobile phone subscriptions.64 In the United States,
it is estimated that 91% of the population has cell phones.65 The improved storage and computing capacity opens the door for phones to
become repositories for coupons, loyalty information, and the contents of our wallets.66 Cell phones’ entry into the e-commerce market
presents an obvious opportunity for consumers who desire convenience and expediency.67 These technological innovations have resulted in the proliferation of mobile payments, or payments “where a
mobile device is used to initiate, authorize, and confirm an exchange
of financial value in return for goods and services.”68
There are two primary forms of mobile payments. The first, remote
payment, allows consumers to use a phone equipped with either short
messaging service (SMS) or wireless application protocol (WAP) tech60. See NIELSON, Smartphones, supra note 4 (stating that nearly half of all American cell
phone users own a smartphone).
61. Press Release, O2, Making Calls Has Become Fifth Most Frequent Use for a Smartphone
for Newly-Networked Generation of Users (June 29, 2012), http://news.o2.co.uk/?press-release=
Making-calls-has-become-fifth-most-frequent-use-for-a-Smartphone-for-newly-networked-gener
ation-of-users.
62. Id.
63. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL
SERVICES 3 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/mobile-device-report201203.pdf (citing JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, SMARTPHONE BANKING SECURITY: MOBILE BANKING UTILIZATION STALLS ON CONSUMER FEARS (2011)).
64. Meena Aharam Rajan, The Future of Wallets: A Look at the Privacy Implications of Mobile Payments, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 445, 446 (2012).
65. Id. at 446–47.
66. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Mobile Payments: Consumer Benefits & New Privacy Concerns 3 (Apr. 24, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2045580.
67. Rajan, supra note 64, at 447.
68. Id.
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nology to send a payment to a merchant or individual.69 SMS payments require a consumer to link a bank account or credit or debit
card to an account that the consumer establishes with a mobile-payment service provider (MPSP).70 When the consumer wants to make
a payment, she sends a text message to the MPSP stating how much
money should be transferred and to what destination.71 Similarly,
WAP payments, while not considered true mobile payments, allow
consumers to access a merchant’s website using their mobile devices
in order to make a purchase.72 This type of payment has also been
successfully housed in a virtual, preloaded gift card that appears on a
consumer’s phone.73
The other primary form of mobile payment, proximity payment,
employs near field communication (NFC) technology and allows consumers to make purchases simply by waving their phone in front of an
NFC-equipped terminal.74 These transactions are completed in precisely the same way as with a credit or debit card.75 The NFC chip in a
consumer’s phone accesses his or her financial account and sends the
data to the merchant’s acquiring bank.76 The acquiring bank then
sends the transaction data to the customer’s bank, which authenticates
and authorizes the transaction.77 This technology is often praised as a
way to consolidate “all of consumers’ financial needs in an easy-to-use
device that consumers already carry.”78
For all of their promise, mobile payments cannot become more conventional unless harmony is achieved between multiple industry players. Industry insiders believe that financial institutions must be the
catalysts that drive the growth of mobile payments.79 This belief is
69. Id.
70. Id. at 448.
71. Id.
72. Rajan, supra note 64, at 449.
73. Id. Starbucks is the most prominent merchant to use this method and has processed over
twenty million mobile payments. See Paula Berger, Starbucks Hits 20M M-Payments, NFC
WORLD (Nov. 8, 2011, 4:28 PM), http://www.nfcworld.com/2011/11/08/311155/starbucks-hits20m-mobile-payments/.
74. Rajan, supra note 64, at 447.
75. Id. at 449.
76. Id. at 450. Alternatively, some companies are obviating the need to own a phone that is
pre-equipped with an NFC chip. See Suzanna Martindale & Gail Hillebrand, Pay at Your Own
Risk? How to Make Every Way to Pay Safe for Mobile Payments, 27 BANKING & FIN. L. REV.
265, 270 (2012). Bling Nation, for example utilizes stickers that contain an NFC chip that can be
affixed to a consumer’s phone. Id. at 270–71.
77. Rajan, supra note 64, at 450.
78. Id. at 449–50.
79. Id. at 463 (citing Ryan Kim, Mobile Payments: Financial Players are in the Driver’s Seat,
GIGAOM (Jan. 3, 2012), http://gigaom.com/2012/01/03/mobile-payments-financial-players-are-inthe-drivers-seat/).
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primarily based on consumer privacy concerns. A 2011 KPMG survey
found that 56% of consumers trusted their financial institution with
their payment data, while only 6% trusted their mobile and internet
service providers.80 Wireless providers will also play a pivotal role in
the development of mobile payments. For example, in 2010, AT&T,
Verizon Wireless, and T-Mobile formed the company Isis with the
goal of creating a uniform nationwide mobile-payment system.81 The
three companies promised more than $100 million to Isis, which also
partnered with Visa, MasterCard, and American Express.82 Of
course, such a system depends on participation by handset manufacturers such as Samsung, Blackberry, and LG, all of which have begun
including NFC chips in their phones.83 Merchants as a group must
also embrace the trend by equipping themselves with NFC-enabled
point-of-sale terminals, an investment that many are still unwilling to
make.84 Finally, third-party developers are a necessary component to
the mobile-payment ecosystem. Google Wallet, for example, is an application that allows consumers to pay using NFC by storing their
credit and debit cards on their mobile phone.85 If even one of these
parties declines to participate, the mobile-payment system fails.
Google Wallet’s struggles vividly illustrate the importance of coordination between each of the aforementioned players. Initially, it was
only available on one phone and supported only two kinds of cards,
one of which was a Google prepaid card, effectively eliminating a substantial portion of the marketplace.86 Merchants also needed to install
NFC readers in order for Google Wallet to function, and consumers
needed to trust Google’s platform to safely store their financial information.87 Predictably, the interested parties in this country have had a
difficult time agreeing on standards and working together to effectu80. Id. at 464 (citing Press Release, KPMG Int’l, KPMG’s 5th Annual Global Consumer &
Convergence Survey Confirms Trend of Accelerated Pace of Consumer Adoption of New Digital Business Models (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/press-releases/lists/expired/consumer-convergence-5-survey.aspx).
81. Zywicki, supra note 47.
82. Rajan, supra note 64, at 463.
83. Id. at 463–64.
84. Id. at 464. Each NFC reader costs approximately $200, while it is estimated that only 10%
of mobile users will be actively using NFC payments by 2015. Id. Those figures, coupled with an
uncertainty over how merchants will be able to send and receive information to consumers’
phones, result in a reluctance to invest in the necessary infrastructure. Id.
85. Id. at 465.
86. Rajan, supra note 64, at 465. Sprint’s Samsung Nexus S 4G was the only phone that allowed Google Wallet, and the Citi MasterCard credit card was the only non-Google card that
was supported. Id.
87. See id.; see also GOOGLE WALLET, http://www.google.com/wallet (last visited Aug. 19,
2013).
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ate this synchronization, despite the fact that NFC technology is now
commonplace overseas.88 For a population that has existed for centuries largely with a checkbook and a wallet, this flurry of innovation
requires a substantial leap of faith.
2. Mobile-Payment Companies
The Durbin Amendment’s effects are perhaps best understood in
the context of several of today’s most popular mobile-payment options. Mobile payments first gained notoriety around 1997, when
Nokia allowed customers to use SMS text messaging to purchase
drinks from Finnish vending machines.89 More recently, SMS payments played a prominent role in the response to the 2010 earthquake
in Haiti.90 The four major wireless carriers allowed customers to text
donations to Haiti through the American Red Cross.91 Since then,
mobile-payment platforms have moved toward applications that allow
users to make purchases directly.
The simplest of the name brand platforms is PayPal, which allows
users to download an application to their phones and send money to a
merchant or individual.92 Recently, PayPal unveiled a system at about
3,000 locations that allows customers to enter a mobile-phone number
and PIN into a retailer’s payment terminal to complete a transaction.93 However, funds for PayPal transactions are still run through
the user’s PayPal account,94 making this process less direct than its
mobile-wallet counterparts.
Mobile wallets allow users to link their credit and debit cards to
their mobile devices in virtual wallets and pay at the register of participating merchants. One of the first true mobile wallets was a startup
company called Square.95 Square has consistently been on the cutting
edge of mobile-payment innovation; it recently integrated a GPS88. Brian X. Chen, A Digital Wallet Now Available on Some Smartphones, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
18, 2012, 7:29 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/visa-digital-wallet/?_r=0. The “interested parties” enumerated are “credit-card companies, banks, technology manufacturers, and
software makers and carriers.” Id.
89. Martindale & Hillebrand, supra note 77, at 270.
90. See id.
91. Id. Wireless customers’ text donations were charged to their phone bills. Id.
92. How to Purchase in Stores, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/webapps/mpp/use-paypal-instores (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
93. Andrew R. Johnson & Robin Sidel, PayPal Discovers the Mall, WALL ST. J., August 23,
2012, at C1.
94. PAYPAL, supra note 92.
95. Square Wallet, SQUARE, http://www.squareup.com/wallet (last visited Oct. 6, 2013); see
also Issie Lapowsky, The Man Who Made the Cash Register Obsolete, INC. MAGAZINE (last updated April 18, 2013), http://www.inc.com/audacious-companies/issie-lapowsky/square.html/1.
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based system that allows a merchant’s register to detect a user’s presence in the store and pull up her name and payment information.96
Other prominent mobile wallets include Google Wallet, Isis, and
LevelUp, which all operate in substantially the same way.97 Even
MasterCard and Visa have unveiled plans to enter the mobile-wallet
marketplace, effectively removing third-party applications from the
equation.98 MasterCard went so far as to call the product its “ ‘big
play’ for the next generation of payments technology.”99 Unsurprisingly, these innovations provide a number of advantages to
consumers.
3. The Benefits of Mobile Payments
The potential benefits of mobile payments have led some in the
technology industry to conclude that a transition to mobile banking is
inevitable,100 recognizing that “this freedom has been in the palm of
[consumers’] hands for years.”101 That conclusion is easy to understand considering that NFC-based technology has been rated by experts from various Swiss mobile-payment consultancies as either
“good” or “excellent” in variables such as scalability, reliability,
speed, ease of use, flexibility, security, cost, and value proposition improvement.102 While privacy and security typically dominate the mobile-payment conversation, this Comment focuses on the benefits of
consumer convenience, merchant savings, and the ability of merchants
and consumers to isolate pertinent advertisements and deals.
The most fundamental benefit of mobile-payment technology is its
convenience. One Starbucks executive aptly summed up what many
consumers believe about mobile payments: they are “really futuristic”
96. See Square Wallet, supra note 95.
97. See GOOGLE WALLET, supra note 87; see also How to Pay with Isis, ISIS, http://www
.paywithisis.com/how.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013); LEVELUP, https://www.thelevelup.com/
how-it-works (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
98. Laura Noonan, MasterCard Aims at Mobile Payment Market with Launch of “Digital Wallet,” REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/25/us-mastercard-pay
ment-idUSBRE91O0MU20130225.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 88. Moreover, Bill Gajda, Visa’s global head of mobile products, said that “all the elements [are coming] into place that’s going to make [mobile payments]
take off.” Id. The industry is spreading quickly in Canada, Singapore, and Hong Kong, “which
should help pique interest among banks and vendors in the American Market.” Id.
101. Kelly Clay, Could Your Smartphone Replace Your Wallet?, FORBES (May 25, 2012), http:/
/www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2012/05/25/could-your-smartphone-replace-your-wallet/.
102. Hussein Issa, Assessment and User Adoption of NFC in Comparison to Other Mobile
Payments Systems 8 (August 16, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1910471.
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and “just plain cool.”103 As previously mentioned, nine out of every
ten Americans currently use a mobile phone,104 and surely a greater
number carry some form of wallet. Safely combining these into a single device is a logical progression. Additionally, mobile wallets can
serve as a repository for purchases records, thus eliminating the problem of lost receipts and rejected returns.105
However, money talks. Regardless of a new payment technology’s
convenience, its success will ultimately depend on merchants’ willingness to facilitate mobile payments—a determination that starts and
ends with the bottom line. Starbucks was one of the first to adopt a
mobile-payment scheme, and its success is a prime example of how
mobile payments may save merchants money. In January of 2011,
Starbucks began offering a mobile-phone application that essentially
operates as a prepaid gift card.106 Through a consumer’s phone or
computer, she can load funds from an existing credit or debit card
onto the Starbucks card.107 Then, when it comes time to pay, customers need only wave a barcode displayed on their mobile phone in front
of the store’s scanner, which will automatically deduct the funds directly from the consumer’s virtual Starbucks card.108 The card also
has a loyalty function that offers special deals and allows consumers to
earn a free drink for every twelve purchases made.109 The program
has resulted in an “unprecedented relationship between [Starbucks]
and [the] customer.”110
More importantly, the mobile-payment option has increased
Starbucks’s revenue by enticing customers into stores more frequently111 and reducing transaction costs.112 In May of 2012,
Starbucks reported that over 25% of its customers paid with either a
103.
104.
105.
106.

Clay, supra note 101.
Rajan, supra note 64, at 446–47.
Hoofnagle et al., supra note 66, at 3.
Olga Kharif, Starbucks Schools Other Retailers on Mobile Payments, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (August 23, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-08-23/starbucksschools-other-retailers-on-mobile-payments.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. My Starbucks Rewards, STARBUCKS COFFEE CO., www.starbucks.com/card/rewards (last
visited Aug. 22, 2013). This reward is only available to “gold” level customers—those who have
made thirty purchases in a twelve-month period. Id.
110. Kharif, supra note 106 (statement of Adam Brotman, Starbucks’s chief digital officer).
111. Id. One Penn State University student began visiting Starbucks twice as frequently as a
result of the iPhone application because “[t]hey send me daily specials, and that makes me want
to run to Starbucks.” Id.
112. See Clay, supra note 101; see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 66, at 3 (stating that “interchange fees represent the second highest expense (after payroll) at Target stores”).
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virtual or physical Starbucks card.113 By reducing other noncash
transactions by 25%, Starbucks has significantly reduced its purchase
process costs by eliminating the credit or debit card company from the
transaction without sacrificing convenience for the customer.114 Ideally, these merchant savings will lead to lower prices for the consumer.115 Similarly, reduced transactional costs can be achieved even
without removing traditional debit and credit card issuers from the
process. As of November 2012, consumers are able to use Square at
Starbucks.116 Square reduces Starbucks’s payment processing costs by
linking consumers’ preexisting credit or debit cards to Square’s application, as opposed to loading funds onto a Starbucks card.117 Of
course, Starbucks is not the only merchant to employ mobile-payment
methods,118 but it is a case study in the industry’s evolution and benefits for the involved parties.
Finally, mobile payments help grow consumer loyalty to particular
merchants who employ the technology, thus increasing sales.119
Whereas payments by traditional debit or credit cards provide no incentive for consumers to become repeat customers of particular
merchants, mobile-payment systems allow merchants to send specialized offers and incentives directly to consumers’ phones.120 Reward
programs are mutually beneficial: they provide additional value to
consumers for buying products they would have purchased anyway,
and they increase merchant sales through incentive programs that in113. Clay, supra note 101.
114. See id.
115. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 66, at 4.
116. Press Release, Starbucks Coffee Co., Starbucks Offers Square Wallet Beginning Today,
(November 7, 2012), http://news.starbucks.com/news/starbucks-offers-square-wallet-beginningtoday.
117. See id.; see also Kharif, supra note 106 (“By letting its customers make purchases with
their smartphones, Starbucks manages to pay fewer fees—which sometimes top 2 percent—on
credit-card transactions.”).
118. See Clay, supra note 101. PayPal recently announced partnerships with fifteen major
retailers that will allow consumers to pay directly from their PayPal account through either their
mobile phone or a point-of-sale system. Id. Those merchants include Abercrombie & Fitch,
Advance Auto Parts, Aéropostale, American Eagle Outfitters, Barnes & Noble, Foot Locker,
Guitar Center, Jamba Juice, and Office Depot. Id.
119. SMART CARD ALLIANCE, supra note 7, at 38.
120. See, e.g., David Hatch, Starbucks Brews Loyalty with Mobile Payment, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (May 15, 2012), http://money.usnews.com/money/business-economy/articles/2012/
05/15/starbucks-brews-loyalty-with-mobile-payment (noting Starbucks’s use of the mobile-payment technology by allowing customers to “download an app that’s synced with their Starbucks
loyalty card, which rewards frequent purchasers with free beverages”); Rewards with Square
Wallet, SQUARE, http://www.squareup.com/help/en-us/article/3922-rewards-with-square-wallet
(last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (providing special rewards for the first time a consumer visits a
merchant, storing loyalty cards on your phone so that reward points are never lost, and automatically keeping track of the reward points you receive from each merchant).
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spire consumers to shop more than they otherwise would.121 Similarly, merchants and advertisers will be able to tailor specific offers or
sales to consumers based on their typical purchases.122 This benefit
extends to the card issuer as well by allowing issuers to combine individualized customer purchase information with retailer data in order
to deliver more personalized offers.123
Despite all of the potential advantages of mobile payments, many
consumers still harbor deep-seated privacy concerns with the technology.124 Current privacy legislation, such as the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978125 and the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act,126 is still being
interpreted with respect to mobile payments.127 It is clear that before
mobile payments can become truly commonplace, these privacy concerns will need to be addressed;128 however it is equally clear that the
framework is in place for the industry to evolve.
III.

ANALYSIS

The Durbin Amendment’s numerous unintended effects on banks
are severely burdening and perhaps stifling the growth of the mobilepayment industry in two primary ways. First, the redistribution of
costs in the banking industry is limiting innovation by merchants, card
issuers, and financial institutions. Second, the twenty-one cent interchange fee’s anticompetitive consequences are closing the only viable avenue for new participants to enter the market. As a result, the
Amendment is creating unnatural and inefficient forces in the debit
card marketplace and inhibiting the natural progression of electronic
payments in this country. Although intended as a financial sector regulation, the Amendment has inadvertently imposed ill-suited and inflexible government controls on the advancement of technology.
121. See SMART CARD ALLIANCE, supra note 7, at 38.
122. Id.
123. Chen, supra note 88.
124. Rajan, supra note 64, at 463 (“[Ninety percent] of consumers are concerned about data
privacy and security in mobile transactions, and see financial institutions in the best position to
address these concerns.”).
125. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012)).
126. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.).
127. See Rajan, supra note 64, at 468.
128. Ultimately, the broad privacy concerns surrounding mobile payments are beyond the
scope of this Comment and will not be discussed.
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A. The Durbin Amendment Disincentivizes
Mobile-Payment Innovation
1. The Durbin Amendment’s Direct Impact on the Current
Financial Landscape
In order to comprehend the severity of the Durbin Amendment’s
ramifications on innovation within the banking industry, one need
only look at the numbers. The Amendment’s regulations, which apply
only to banks with greater than $10 billion in assets,129 affect only
about sixty banks and three large credit unions.130 The largest banks,
including Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase (Chase), have nearly
$2 trillion in assets, while other banks, such as TCF Bank, just barely
surpass the Amendment’s $10 billion threshold.131 Despite these
enormous disparities, the Amendment’s fee regulation applies equally
to all banks within this category.132 Perhaps more significant than the
size discrepancy is the fact that TCF Bank has no credit card business,
instead dealing solely in debit cards.133 Thus, the Amendment’s fee
restrictions have a far greater effect on TCF Bank’s revenue than on
that of most of the other banks that fall within the Amendment’s purview.134 Conversely, banks with assets of less than $10 billion escape
the reach of the Amendment and do not need to mitigate lost revenue.135 In fact, there are about 7,000 banks and 7,500 credit unions
that fall below the asset threshold.136
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A) (2012).
130. Richard A. Epstein, The Dangerous Experiment of the Durbin Amendment: Congress’
Interchange Fee Limit is a Reckless Exercise in Price Regulation, REGULATION, Spring 2011, at
24, 24.
131. FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE: LARGE COMMERCIAL
BANKS, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current/default.htm (last updated June 30,
2013); see also Epstein, supra note 130, at 25 (“TCF Bank . . . has about $18 billion in assets, less
than 1 percent the size of the three biggest banks.”).
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2). TCF Bank challenged the constitutionality of the Amendment for this reason. According to TCF’s counsel in that suit, “TCF cannot raise fees in the face
of direct competition from small banks that can continue to offer free debit cards,” and as a
result, “TCF must fight the Durbin Amendment because it receives no new revenue source from
the passage of the legislation, for its preexisting right to charge customers is worth nothing under
the current tilted playing field.” Epstein, supra note 130, at 29; accord TCF Nat’l Bank v.
Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding the Amendment constitutional).
133. Epstein, supra note 130, at 25.
134. Id.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A); see also Odysseas Papadimitirou, The Durbin Amendment
Will Make You Give Up Your Debit Card, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.business
insider.com/the-durbin-amendment-will-make-you-give-up-your-debit-card-2010-12.
136. Epstein, supra note 130, at 24. For example, Texas Capital Bank has a mere $298 million
more in assets than Israel Discount Bank of New York, but Texas Capital Bank is regulated by
the Amendment while Israel Discount Bank may set its interchange rates as high as it likes. See
FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 131.
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The most obvious, palpable effect of the Amendment is the billions
of dollars banks have lost from the reduced interchange fee.137 It is
estimated that in order to offset anticipated losses caused by the regulations, banks would have to charge account holders $100 annually.138
Instead, in what seems like a consumer-friendly gesture by comparison, Bank of America announced in September of 2011 that it would
charge customers $5 per month to maintain their debit card accounts.139 This fee applied to all customers who made at least one
purchase per month using their debit cards, regardless of whether they
chose “debit” or “credit” as the method of transaction.140 Bank of
America openly acknowledged that the fee’s purpose was to compensate for losses incurred under the Amendment.141 Chase also discussed implementing a $5 ATM withdrawal fee for non-Chase
customers and a $3 monthly debit fee in select markets.142 Not surprisingly, the public outcry against these fees was swift and intense.143
The consumer base was so incensed that a Financial Securities Index
poll found that 64% of consumers would change banks if a fee were
imposed.144 In addition to new account fees, many banks also considered eliminating debit card rewards programs and reducing the scale,
flexibility, or availability of their debit card offerings.145
The impact of the banks’ scramble to recover revenue lost as a result of the Amendment has disturbed even the most fundamental elements of the transaction framework. For instance, early checking
systems required the merchant to bear the risk of bounced checks because the bank had little or no information about an account balance
137. Banks lost $8 billion in the first year after the passage of the Amendment alone.
Timothy H. Lee, When Even Barney Frank Sings the Praises of Free Markets, We Must Listen,
FORBES (May 28, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/05/28/when-even-barneyfrank-sings-the-praises-of-free-markets-we-must-listen/.
138. Epstein, supra note 130, at 26.
139. Eryk J. Wachnik, Consumer News, “The Durbin Tax” and How the Banks Tried to Insure
Their Bottom Line, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 318, 325 (2011).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 320.
142. Id. at 321.
143. See id. at 322 (“[S]ocial networking sites, such as Twitter, exploded with posts about the
unfairness of Bank of America’s fee and the willingness of many consumers to take their business to another bank.”).
144. Id. (citing Claes Bell, Americans Say They’d Bolt Bank Over Fees, BANKRATE.COM (Mar.
21, 2011), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/consumer-index/march-2011-financial-securitypoll.aspx). Twenty-eight percent of respondents stated that they would not change banks and
the remaining eight percent did not know what they would do or did not have a checking account. Id.
145. Mary J. Dent, A Rose by Any Other Name: How Labels Get in the Way of U.S. Innovation Policy, 8 BERKLEY BUS. L.J. (SYMP. EDITION) 128, 159–60 (2011); see also Papadimitirou,
supra note 135.
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when a check was drawn.146 Today, technology enables banks to continuously monitor credit and debit transactions, thereby allowing
banks to assume the risk of bounced payments from the merchants.147
Consequently, banks are more willing to authorize a payment on an
overdrawn account into which they know a monthly paycheck will
soon be deposited.148 The charge for assuming that risk is then folded
into the interchange fee.149 The Amendment has upset this system
and “introduc[ed] a serious regulatory inefficiency” into the debit
market.150 This will result in the shuffling of costs within the
marketplace.
2. The Redistribution of Costs in the Banking Industry Will Depress
the Value of Payment Networks and Discourage Investment
Payment cards are, by any measure, more innovative than other
payment methods.151 Debit and credit cards provide an “instantaneous, convenient, global, secure payment system accessible 24 hours a
day, anywhere in the world.”152 Moreover, innovation has led to
longer bank hours, more bank branches, and new online and mobile
banking products.153 Compared to checks, which have remained fundamentally the same since their advent in the Middle Ages, it is easy
to see how the marriage of payment cards and technology has succeeded.154 Unfortunately, the Durbin Amendment’s price controls
discourage innovation by making it more difficult to recoup investment in industry infrastructure.155 Without innovation in the debit
card industry, the prospect of developing a successful mobile-payment
network is remote.
The structure of the payment-card marketplace makes it uniquely
vulnerable to slowed growth as a result of these government-imposed
losses. In an ordinary market, a buyer and seller operate independently of each other and without concern for the other’s success or
146. Epstein, supra note 130, at 27.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Zywicki, supra note 47.
152. Id.
153. Todd Zywicki, The Dick Durbin Bank Fees, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2011, at A15.
154. See Zywicki, supra note 47. One significant change to checks has occurred in the past
decade now that banks have begun converting paper checks into electronic images. Id. Still,
checks have become so obsolete that Great Britain has announced a plan to terminate the acceptance of checks by 2018 in favor of electronic transactions. Id.
155. Id.
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failure.156 The payment-card market, however, operates differently.
It is a two-sided market—a market without the same autonomy,
where “the ability to satisfy one side of the market depends on the
continued participation of the other.”157 In the payment-card market,
the debit interchange system creates equilibrium because both banks
and merchants benefit from the increased use of debit cards.158 That
is, issuing banks receive payments from merchants in the form of interchange fees to support the banks’ efforts to draw in consumers.159
The merchants must develop their own processing systems, while issuing banks must price their services most effectively to attract
customers.160
Consider this common scenario: an issuing bank offers debit cards
for free but charges consumers for defaulting; in exchange for attracting customers to the payment system used by the merchant, the
merchant pays the issuing bank an interchange fee.161 The Amendment, however, obstructs the payment from merchants to card issuers
by imposing an artificially low ceiling on the value of that transaction.162 The Amendment considers only the marginal cost of transactions, as opposed to the overall cost of building, maintaining, and
improving the network—a failure that has forced banks to cut costs in
other areas.163 One such cut involves issuing banks offering a smaller
bundle of services to merchants.164 For instance, merchants may be
asked to assume the losses from overdrawn accounts, or banks may
simply stop contributing funds to the introduction of new technologies, such as mobile-payment platforms.165 The resulting inefficient
156. Epstein, supra note 130, at 26 (citing William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541 (1983)) (“[T]he seller of
apples wants high prices from customers who seek low prices.”).
157. Id. Epstein uses the example of a singles bar to illustrate a two-sided market. Id. According to Epstein, it is easier to get men than women to attend a singles bar. Id. Therefore,
charging men and women the same price for drinks would result in an excess of men, which
would cause the bar to fail. Id. Assuming that the uniform price of a drink is $10, men will be
willing to pay $15 to attract women, while women will only have to pay $8. Id. Some of the
men’s surplus is used to bring the market into equilibrium, making both sides better off. Id. In
this or any two-sided market, Epstein explains, there is a transfer of payment between the two
groups facilitated by a “network”—in this case the bar. Id.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 27.
161. See Epstein, supra note 130, at 27. In this example, the interchange network operated by
Visa or MasterCard is serving the same function as the singles bar owner. See supra note 157.
162. Lee, supra note 137; see also 12 C.F.R. § 235.3 (2012).
163. Lee, supra note 137.
164. Epstein, supra note 130, at 27.
165. Id.
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funding structure will likely lead to system-wide cutbacks, thus
preventing the introduction of new technologies.166
Banks could also avoid the Amendment’s reach by only investing in
new technologies that operate outside of the Amendment’s purview.
The definition of “debit card” under the Amendment includes any
product that directly debits a consumer’s account.167 This definition
encompasses mobile-payment systems that similarly deduct funds directly from a consumer’s account; thus, banks will be less likely to
contribute to that payment model knowing that their profit potential
is statutorily capped. New technology and infrastructure are needed
to get started, but the Amendment does not allow for banks and
merchants to fund these efforts.168 Notably, the Amendment does not
regulate prepaid mobile accounts,169 such as those offered by
Starbucks or PayPal.170 The likely result will be “regulatory arbitrage” as financial institutions will be forced to design products “not
solely to maximize their economic and technological viability but to
gerrymander them out of the Durbin [A]mendment’s net.”171
Lastly, the Amendment will depress the marketplace as a whole.
The payment-card industry is based on a network that links together
consumers, merchants, and financial institutions.172 Similar to any
other profit-based network, the payment-card network’s value increases as the number of users on all sides increases and the costs of
operating the network decrease.173 Therefore, if the Amendment
forces banks to impose new and greater fees on consumers, causing
consumers to exit the banking industry, the overall value of the network will decrease.174 The upshot would be that by significantly deterring investment in the new infrastructure, card issuers would
instead focus on minimizing the cost of operations.175 Put simply, “[i]f
card issuers cannot recover the cost of new innovation, then they sim166. See id.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(c)(2) (2012). The Amendment defines “debit card” as “any card, or
other payment code or device, issued or approved for use through a payment card network to
debit an asset account (regardless of the purpose for which the account is established), whether
authorization is based on signature, PIN, or other means.” Id.; see also Zywicki, supra note 47.
168. See Zywicki, supra note 47.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(7); see also Papadimitirou, supra note 135 (“[P]repaid cards are
unregulated by the Durbin Amendment . . . .”).
170. See supra notes 106–118 and accompanying text.
171. Zywicki, supra note 47.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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ply will not innovate.”176 If that occurs, mobile-payment technology is
sure to be one of the first casualties.
3. The Durbin Amendment’s Interchange-Fee Limit and SmallBank Exception Are Driving Consumers Away from the
Large Banks that Are More Likely to Fuel Innovation
While the overall value of the marketplace will certainly drive investment decisions, the most persuasive factor will be the number of
consumers participating in the market. As it stands, the Durbin
Amendment is likely to drive consumers either (1) away from the regulated large financial institutions to smaller, exempt banks, or (2) out
of the banking system altogether and into the comforting arms of cash
and prepaid cards. Both of these consumer migrations will drastically
reduce the value of the debit card industry and disincentivize the largest banks from growing mobile-payment options within it. Finally,
these two appreciable shifts in the payment marketplace will likely
negate any savings that Senator Durbin claims to have intended for
merchants.
The first way the Amendment will shift consumers is through the
small-bank exception, which applies to banks with less than $10 billion
in assets.177 While larger banks must consider recouping Durbin-created losses through cost-saving measures such as slashing rewards programs, small banks will remain unregulated and thus able to offer
more appealing rewards programs on their debit cards.178 Large
banks have even eliminated free checking accounts in an attempt to
recover lost revenue.179 The percentage of bank accounts eligible for
free checking at Durbin-affected large banks peaked at 76% in 2008—
up drastically from under 10% in 2001—but has since plummeted to
176. Id.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A) (2012).
178. Papadimitirou, supra note 135. For example, “Co-op Services Credit Union of Livonia,
MI, announced a policy involving a $105 new account bonus to any first time customer who
opened an account with direct deposit.” Laura Brown et al., The Durbin Derby – Are There
Any Winners? 16 n.73 (Jan. 9, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/events/business_law/2012/01/consumer/2012_consumer_committee_
meeting_agenda.authcheckdam.pdf (presented at the ABA Committee on Consumer Financial
Services 2012 Winter Meeting, Jan. 7–10, 2012). Also, “Randolph-Brooks Federal Credit Union
of Texas offered to give members $0.10 back for every debit card purchase they made over a
three month period.” Id. Finally, and perhaps most telling, FirstBank Colorado of Lakewood,
Colorado “launched a campaign to provide any potential customers with comparison information on his current bank’s fees, in order to show that potential customer how much he could save
with FirstBank’s free checking account.” Id.
179. See Lee, supra note 137.
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45% in 2012 following the passage of the Amendment.180 Taken together, it is clear that small banks stand to gain an increased share of
the debit card marketplace by luring consumers who are unwilling or
unable to sustain the increased cost of banking at large banks.181 This
shift is likely to be especially drastic among low-income consumers.
While wealthier consumers may choose to remain with large banks
and avoid new banking fees by using their credit cards, low-income
consumers are less likely to be approved for credit and thus more
likely to switch banks.182
Many analysts maintain that the small-bank exception will not yield
these positive effects on exempt institutions, and that a shift in consumers from large to small banks will not occur.183 Even Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke believed that the exception
would not operate as intended because small banks would be forced
to lower their transaction costs in order to compete with the statutorily restricted large banks.184 However, a recent survey by the Federal
Reserve allayed those concerns, finding instead that the small-bank
exception is “working as intended” because small banks and credit
unions were able to charge “more than double the average fee of large
lenders for debit transactions” in 2012.185
Consumer migration to small, less expensive banks may appear to
epitomize the free market, but it will have untoward consequences on
the future of mobile payments. Large banks drive innovation: they
possess the resources and motivation to invest in new systems such as
180. Todd Zywicki, Consumers are the Winners in the Visa/MasterCard Antitrust Settlement,
FORBES (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/08/21/consumers-are-the-win
ners-in-the-visamastercard-antitrust-settlement/.
181. See Papadimitirou, supra note 135.
182. Zywicki, supra note 153.
183. See, e.g., Stephen J. Shapiro, The Small Bank Exemption to Dodd-Frank’s Swipe Fee
Regulations: “Honor-All-Cards” Contractual Provisions May Not Protect Small Banks, BLOOMBERG L. REP. – BANKING & FIN., Apr. 4, 2011, at 4 (“[T]he industry has argued[ ] the market will
force smaller banks to lower their swipe fees to compete with the capped rates the larger banks
will be required to charge.”).
184. Congress Updated on Dodd-Frank, Debit Card Interchange Fee Rule, FED. BANKING L.
REP. (CCH), Report Letter No. 2407, at 6, 6–7 (Feb. 24, 2011) (Bernanke stated the possibility
that, “because merchants will reject more expensive cards from smaller institutions, or because
networks will not be willing to differentiate the interchange fee for issuers of different sizes . . .
[the] exemption will not be effective in the marketplace” (alteration in original)).
185. Michael Crittenden, Study Rebuts Banks on Swipe Fees, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2013, at
C2. Banking industry and retailer representatives have questioned that study because of the
small sample size and anecdotal evidence to the contrary. Id. A spokesman for the Credit
Union National Association stated that he welcomed the results of the study, but cautioned that
the Association “continue[s] to have grave concerns about debit-interchange income for credit
unions over the long term.” Id.
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mobile payments.186 In contrast, small institutions generally do not
spearhead innovation within the banking system.187 Thus, while it
may appear that consumers remain unaffected by the Amendment because they will simply obtain no-fee debit accounts from other banks,
that shortsighted analysis ignores the need for large banks to champion the growth of mobile payments. If returns are the primary reason for anyone to consider an investment, the Amendment has all but
sealed the fate of mobile-payment innovation by guaranteeing that no
return is possible.188
Additionally, the higher cost of debit transactions may drive a large
number of consumers out of the mainstream banking system altogether. When faced with increased fees, many consumers will choose
to rely more heavily on unregulated payment methods such as prepaid
cards and cash.189 In fact, it is estimated that new fees on previously
free checking accounts will drive more than one million customers out
of the mainstream banking system.190 Even consumers who do not
wholly abandon their debit accounts will be disincentivized to use
their newly regulated debit cards.191
This anticipated shift to small, unregulated banks would negate the
cost benefit that merchants (and therefore consumers) were meant to
enjoy and that served as the primary impetus for the Amendment.192
Heartland Payment Systems, one of the nation’s largest payment
processors, estimated that the average merchant would save around
$1,000 per year because of the Amendment.193 However, that estimate gave no consideration to the possibility that merchants may, in
turn, be forced to assume costs that were previously paid by banks. In
fact, a recent study found that one year after the Amendment took
effect, consumers were paying, on average, 1.5% more at popular retailers than they were prior to its enactment.194 Sixty-seven percent of
the retailers visited for that study had either kept prices the same or
186. See Zywicki, supra note 47.
187. Id.
188. See generally id. (“[T]he Durbin [A]mendment’s price controls on debit cards by definition will reduce the incentive to make any investments that cannot be recouped . . . .”).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Zywicki, supra note 47.
192. See id.
193. Wachnik, supra note 137, at 325.
194. Elec. Payments Coal., Where’s the Debit Discount? The Durbin Effect: Retailers Gain
Without Consumer Benefit, WHERE’S MY DEBIT DISCOUNT? 3 (Sept. 28, 2012), http://wheresmy
debitdiscount.com/wp-content/themes/epc/media/Durbin%20White%20Paper_092812_small
.pdf.
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increased prices since the enactment of the Amendment.195 Despite
those price increases and the Amendment’s favoritism, merchants
have not realized increased profits—strong evidence that the interchange-fee ceiling was ill-conceived. Merchants represented the
only group that the Amendment could potentially have encouraged to
invest in mobile-payment infrastructure. Now that merchants must
shuffle costs and reassess business strategies in the same way as large
banks, innovation will necessarily be put on hold.
The Amendment’s underlying policy goals also undermine the mobile-payment industry’s growth. Given that the Amendment was
passed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and applies only to
banks with greater than $10 billion in assets, the government’s hierarchy of interests seems obvious: “The prevailing political winds favored
the interests of small banks over merchants and the interests of
merchants over big banks.”196 After all, debit cards obviously played
no part in what was “at heart a credit crisis.”197 Still, Senator Durbin
exploited “the frenzied anti-bank environment of the post-crisis era”
to pass an interchange-fee regulation designed to create a windfall for
retailers.198 While politicians appear to favor certain players and redistribute wealth in the market, new mobile-payment companies will
likely find themselves unable to gain footing. Without oversight of
politicians’ true motives, it remains relatively easy for them to grant
“political favors”—a term some use to describe the Amendment.199
Lastly, the most authoritative support for these contentions, and
what should serve as the coup de grâce for the Amendment, came
from one of the coauthors of Dodd–Frank. Congressman Barney
Frank, a man described as “hyper-regulatory,” recently conceded that
“a free market approach in this area will be better for the economy
and all concerned parties than the current system [under the Amendment].”200 The banking industry continues to endure the unintended
consequences of the Amendment’s unnatural legislative pressures on
what was a free market, which has forced the industry’s players to
195. Id. That study found that prices were $2.22 (or 6.6%) more for the same items at Home
Depot in Atlanta, Georgia. Id. at 10. Walmart saw increases of $0.80 (or 5.4%) for the same
items in Portland, Maine. Id. 7-Eleven prices increased $1.00 (or 2.6%) for the same items in
Washington, D.C. Id. Finally, Walgreens showed a price increase of $0.30 (or 2.9%) for the
same items in Boston, Massachusetts. Id.
196. Zywicki, supra note 55, at 204.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 206.
200. Lee, supra note 137. Indeed, “[w]hen Barney Frank sings the praises of the free market
as a superior alternative, it speaks volumes.” Id.
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reassign costs and risks.201 Unsurprisingly, banks and merchants are
less willing to innovate in the arena of mobile payments while their
own finances and the marketplace remain atrophied due to
Dodd–Frank.202
B. The Durbin Amendment is Naturally Anticompetitive and
Prevents New Participants from Entering the
Mobile-Payment Marketplace
One of the Durbin Amendment’s most egregious offenses is its exclusion of new entrants from the payment-card market. The Amendment’s provisions operate as a barrier to entry in two ways: (1) the
interchange-fee limit of twenty-one cents203 leaves little room for new
mobile-payment companies to price themselves below the market; and
(2) the requirement that card transactions be offered on at least two
networks204 prevents new technologies from competing for a share of
the market that is primarily occupied by Visa and MasterCard.205
First, the Amendment has arbitrarily reduced interchange fees for
incumbent providers of payment systems.206 This cap discourages a
new mobile-payment-industry participant from entering the market as
a “low-cost provider.”207 Where a startup is forced to compete at the
same price point as a well-established market participant, such as
Bank of America, it is unlikely that the startup will achieve economic
viability. This consequence is exacerbated by the small-bank exception to the Amendment, which is expected to afford small banks an
increased share of the marketplace.208
Moreover, if the interchange-fee regulation merely discourages
market entrants, the dual network requirement essentially forecloses
entry. The Amendment now requires that every payment card be accessible by at least two card networks.209 As the startup Isis articulated in its plea to the Federal Reserve,210 it is nearly impossible for a
201. See Wachnik, supra note 137, at 325; see also Zywicki, supra note 47.
202. Zywicki, supra note 47.
203. 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1) (2012); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2012).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(1)(A).
205. See Laura Brown et al., supra note 178 (manuscript at 4) (“The Visa and MasterCard
systems are responsible for processing 83% of all debit card transactions, with other small network operators controlling the remainder.”).
206. Zywicki, supra note 47.
207. Id.
208. Papadimitirou, supra note 135.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(1)(A).
210. For a more detailed analysis of the rise and fall of Isis, see infra notes 212–223 and accompanying text.
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startup to secure investments when its service is necessarily pitted
against the industry’s biggest players from the start.211
Taken together, these two provisions serve as difficult hurdles to
prospective market entrants at best, and insurmountable obstacles at
worst. As a result of the Amendment’s restrictions, new entities will
be unable to compete as alternatives to traditional banking because
they cannot price themselves below the market. Mobile-payment entrepreneurs will be equally unable to garner support as an alternative
to traditional payment networks because the Amendment dictates
that they must immediately compete with the likes of Visa and MasterCard. Seemingly, the only remaining option for new mobile-payment companies looking to break into the market is to align with
preexisting market players.
For these reasons, this Comment advocates for a mobile-payment
exception to the Amendment. Congress should not allow Senator
Durbin’s eleventh hour, unsubstantiated regulation of the complex financial industry to prevent the natural and beneficial evolution toward mobile payments.
IV.

IMPACT

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The Growth and Stagnation of Isis
Before turning to this Comment’s purposed solution to the stifling
effects of the Durbin Amendment, it is helpful to briefly recount the
story of Isis, a real-world example of the aforementioned concepts in
action. In its current form, Isis is the prototypical mobile wallet; it
holds consumers’ payment cards in virtual form on a user’s phone and
uses NFC technology to make payments at the point of sale.212 However, Isis is dramatically different from the technology imagined in its
original business plan. It began as a joint venture formed by three
major wireless companies: AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon.213 Their
stated goal was to “build[ ] a mobile payment network that utilizes
mobile phones to make point-of-sale purchases.”214 This was an ambi211. See Letter from Michael J. Abbott, CEO, Isis, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys. (Feb. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Abbott Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
SECRS/2011/March/20110302/R-1404/R-1404_022211_67244_584250173294_1.pdf.
212. How to Pay with Isis, supra note 97.
213. Colin C. Richard, Dodd-Frank, International Remittances, and Mobile Banking: The Federal Reserve’s Role in Enabling International Economic Development, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 248, 254 (2011).
214. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Press Release, AT&T Mobility LLC, AT&T, T-Mobile and Verizon Wireless Announce Joint Venture to Build National Mobile Commerce Network (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://www.att.com/gen/pressroom?pid=1867-&cdvn=news&
newsarticleid=31369&mapcode=).
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tious objective, albeit a subtle one that warrants emphasis: Isis did not
want to operate its platform on the preexisting networks run primarily
by Visa and MasterCard. Rather, Isis aimed to compete with Visa and
MasterCard as a payment network, a goal that seemed to indicate
“the beginning of the transition from a card-based payment economy
to a mobile-based payment economy.”215 Isis’s network was to be the
uniform standard for mobile payments216 and would have provided
unbanked customers with electronic bill pay and banking services.217
Unfortunately, not only was Isis’s ambition never realized, it did not
even have the opportunity to make a sincere attempt. Isis planned to
charge merchants a lower interchange price than the prevailing market rate.218 The lower rate was intended to entice merchants to make
the substantial up-front investment needed to equip their stores with
the mobile-payment infrastructure—in Isis’s case, an NFC reader.219
That plan became untenable in the wake of the Amendment’s interchange regulation, which essentially halved the fee that Isis sought
to undercut.220 Consequently, Isis filed a comment letter to that effect
with the Federal Reserve in February of 2011.221 The letter also explained how the requirement that transactions be capable of processing on two networks stifled innovation: “Why would anyone invest in
a new payment system if they are forced . . . to add a scale-competitor? This would seem akin to requiring small businesses to locate only
next to an established national ‘category killer’ retailer in the same
product line.”222 The letter also asserted more broadly that “it is still
unclear if any new debit network will emerge if there is no viable return on investment due to fee caps,” and it strongly urged the Board
to “consider the unintended consequences [of the Amendment] and
their potential impact on innovation, jobs and the competitiveness of
the U.S. payments market.”223
The Isis case study demonstrates how the government’s overregulation of the financial industry has had devastating effects on card issu215. Id. at 254 & n.45.
216. Rajan, supra note 64, at 463.
217. Zywicki, supra note 47. It should also be noted that the pool of unbanked consumers is
expected to grow in the wake of the Amendment. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (2012) (capping interchange fees for electronic debit transactions at 21 cents); see also Debit Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,397 (July
20, 2011) (“The average interchange fee for all debit card transactions [in 2009] was 44 cents per
transaction . . . .”).
221. See Abbott Letter, supra note 211.
222. Id. at 1–2.
223. Id. at 2.
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ers, merchants, banks, and as a result, the mobile-payment industry.
The Amendment has become the quintessential example of public
policy gone wrong.224 The obvious solution for overregulation is deregulation, which would mean a wholesale repeal of the Amendment.225 However, it is clear that the Amendment’s effect on mobile
payments would not be a sufficient impetus for repealing such a farreaching regulation. Nonetheless, the mobile-payment industry has
the potential to make a substantial enough impact on the economy to
warrant redress. One industry analyst estimates that the total value of
mobile payments globally will reach $670 billion by 2015.226 Apart
from total repeal, two viable solutions warrant discussion: (1) provide
incentives for merchants to install mobile-payment infrastructure, and
(2) create an exception to the Amendment’s regulations for mobilepayment transactions.
B. Incentives for the Adoption of Mobile-Payment Technology
One potential solution is to incentivize the use of mobile payments
in order to offset some of the costs created by the Durbin Amendment. The need for incentives to jumpstart the mobile-payment industry was apparent even before consideration of the Amendment’s
damaging effects. For instance, the debate over chip-enabled cards,
largely the same technology as mobile payments, centers on a similar
“chicken-and-egg issue.”227 “Many merchants say they don’t want to
invest in the new technology if banks won’t issue the cards. The
banks, meanwhile, say they don’t want to invest in the cards because
newer technology, such as mobile-device payments, will leapfrog the
need for chip-enabled plastic.”228
In response to that conflict, some of the industry’s key players have
implemented incentives for merchants to invest in the necessary infrastructure. Visa has instituted a program encouraging merchants to
224. See Lee, supra note 137.
225. The repeal of the Amendment has support. U.S. Representatives Jason Chaffetz and Bill
Owens introduced a bill to repeal the Amendment in 2011. Robb Mandelbaum, In Battling
Merchants, Banks Still Hope to Overturn Durbin Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011, 1:00 P.M.),
http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/in-battle-with-merchants-banks-still-hope-to-overturndurbin-amendment/.
226. Olga Kharif, Visa Unveils Incentives to Speed Shift to Mobile-Payment Systems, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-09/visa-unveils-plan-to-speedadoption-of-mobile-payment-systems.html.
227. Robin Sidel & Ann Zimmerman, Visa Pushing New Card Technology, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904480904576498484264333872.html
(“In addition to accepting traditional swipe cards and the chip-enabled cards, the cash-register
terminals also will be equipped to process payments made with cell phones.”).
228. Id.
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adopt mobile-payment-ready technology at their establishments.229
As with any effective incentive, Visa’s plan contains both a carrot and
a stick. The carrot is Visa’s elimination of its requirement that
merchants certify their compliance with anti-fraud security standards
if at least 75% of Visa transactions come from the terminal.230 By
eliminating the certification requirement, merchants save more than
$2 billion per year.231 Conversely, the stick is that merchants who do
not install the technology will be liable for costs of fraud arising from
the chip-enabled card—costs that are currently borne by banks.232
McDonald’s and Nordstrom have come forward in support of Visa’s
plan.233 Similarly, PayPal plans to subsidize its point-of-sale service,
meaning that merchants would pay less for PayPal transactions than
they do for more established credit and debit processors.234 These incentive-based strategies are aimed at facilitating the growth of mobilepayment technology by making the necessary infrastructure more accessible to merchants.
Unfortunately, while these privatized incentives encourage
merchants to invest in the corresponding point-of-sale technology,
they do nothing to offset the enormous Durbin-created losses incurred
by banks. Incentives also do little to reduce the barriers to entry that,
for example, prevented Isis from participating in the market. Thus,
although private programs may have the long-term effect of bringing
mobile payments into more businesses, this is likely insufficient
redress.
C. A Mobile-Payment Exception
Alternatively, legislators could create an exception to the interchange-fee ceiling for mobile payments, which can be modeled after the interchange-fee-cap exemption for banks with less than $10
billion in assets.235 This additional exception should be drafted with
banks and merchants’ input and should allow them to privately agree
on the proper fee for all transactions processed over a user’s mobile
device. Allowing natural market forces to dictate the costs and fees
associated with mobile payments will encourage merchants and banks
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
2012),
10.
235.

See generally id.
Sidel & Zimmerman, supra note 227.
See Kharif, supra note 226.
Sidel & Zimmerman, supra note 227.
Kharif, supra note 226.
Alistair Barr, PayPal Exec Woos Big Retailers with Pricing, Data, REUTERS (Feb. 10,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/10/paypal-kingsborough-idUSL2E8D8AE7201202
See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A) (2012).

152

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:123

to invest in the technology, as well as reopen the door for startups to
enter the market at a discounted rate. It is therefore the conclusion of
this Comment that an exception for transactions made with mobilepayment technology would be best suited to mend the damage caused
by the Durbin Amendment.
To address feasibility concerns, it must initially be noted that alterations to Dodd–Frank have been discussed in Congress as recently as
December 2012.236 Republican lawmakers, resigned to the fact that
Dodd–Frank will not be repealed in its entirety, are turning to “technical corrections” of the Act.237 Indeed, some corrective measures
have already been approved in the House.238 “But what constitutes a
technical correction is in the eye of the beholder,” and while proponents of Dodd–Frank intend to use the corrections to enhance the
regulations, opponents see it as an opportunity to undermine the entire Act.239
As a correction to Dodd–Frank, an exception for mobile payments
would be beneficial to both banks and merchants. First, it would allow issuers to charge a rate comparable to the forty-four cent interchange fee that existed prior to Dodd–Frank for all debit
transactions conducted with a user’s mobile device.240 If issuers could
receive twice as much revenue from mobile transactions as they did
from traditional card payments, they would be more likely to encourage consumers to adopt the technology. This could manifest itself
as a greater number of mobile options or more enticing rewards programs for mobile accounts. Notably, the fee would not need to be
very high; a carefully drafted exception would allow banks to set fees
commensurate with costs. Moreover, issuers would be more willing to
provide merchants with the necessary point-of-sale equipment if they
knew they could receive a higher interchange fee. At the very least,
issuers would be likely to subsidize costs of new infrastructure for
merchants.
236. See Cheyenne Hopkins, Technical Fixes Prompt Suspicion from Dodd-Frank Backers,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-10/technical-fixesprompt-suspicion-from-dodd-frank-backers.html.
237. Derek Klobucher, Dodd-Frank Stands Technically Corrected and Small Banks Lose,
FORBES (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2012/12/17/dodd-frank-stands-techni
cally-corrected-and-small-banks-lose/.
238. See Hopkins, supra note 236 (“The chamber approved a bill in March to exempt manufacturers and commercial swap-users from collateral requirements and ease regulations on intercompany trades. Other measures have won committee approval and are awaiting floor votes.”).
239. Klobucher, supra note 237.
240. Sandwith, supra note 36, at 224.
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Most importantly, the exception would create an impetus for sellers
of inexpensive items to invest in mobile-payment technology. Before
the Amendment took effect, card issuers gave merchants discounts on
small transactions.241 When the interchange cap took effect, the banking industry eliminated those discounts.242 Chris McWilton, president
of U.S. markets for MasterCard, explained that old interchange fees
subsidized the small-ticket discounts, but the model could no longer
be sustained under the Amendment.243 In response, small-item
merchants such as Dairy Queen and Redbox are raising prices or considering incentives for customers who pay with cash.244 Therefore, if
mobile payments are beyond the Amendment’s reach, card issuers
may once again have discretion to gradate the interchange rate according to the size of purchases. Just as issuers once offered discounts
to encourage a greater use of debit cards,245 this proposed exception
would similarly encourage greater use of mobile payments.
The cumulative effect of this exception would carry over to larger
retailers as well. As more consumers are persuaded to utilize mobile
payments, retailers of all sizes will be likely to follow suit in an effort
to attract that demographic. At the outset, a higher fee for mobile
payments would almost certainly trouble merchants. This was the
same concern expressed when OpenTable first gained notoriety, and
its proliferation is analogous to this Comment’s mobile-payment proposal. OpenTable allows users to make dining reservations online and
collects a fee from the corresponding restaurant.246 Additionally,
OpenTable requires a large up-front investment in technology infrastructure.247 Although restaurants concede that the price is “insanely
high,” they recognize that the service is “amazing,” “incredible,” and
“money well spent” because of the increase in business OpenTable
creates.248 In 2012, more than 26,000 restaurants subscribed to
241. Robin Sidel, Debit-Fee Cap Has Nasty Side Effect, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2010), http://on
line.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204319004577084613307585768.html?mod=WSJ_hp_
LEFTTopStories#printMode.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id.
246. Mark Caro, Reservations Please: Open Table’s Online Service Convenient for Diners but
Pricey for Restaurants, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 2012, § 5, at 1. OpenTable charges one dollar per
seat for all reservations made through OpenTable’s own website and twenty-five cents per seat
for all reservations made from a restaurant’s website that directs diners to OpenTable. Id.
247. See id. The subscription price for an OpenTable computer is $199 per month and there is
an initial installation and equipment fee of $200. Id. The OpenTable bill for the Publican restaurant in Chicago is more than $3,400 per month. Id.
248. Id.
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OpenTable, up from 17,000 the year before.249 One prominent Chicago restaurant group estimated that 50%–60% of its restaurants’ reservations are made through OpenTable.250
Just as OpenTable is seen as a necessary evil for restaurants, larger
retailers may someday have the same view of mobile-payment technology. As issuers and financial institutions work to shepherd consumers toward mobile payments, consumers may choose to conduct
their business at retailers that accept mobile payments. This will be
especially true with “big box” retailers, which sell products that are
identical to the products sold by competitors.251 If, for example, a
bank offers a lucrative rewards program for mobile payments in order
to encourage participation, those utilizing the service will shop at retailers accepting mobile payments before turning to those that do not.
Finally, an exception for mobile payments would eliminate the barrier to entry that prevented Isis from implementing its original business model.252 Isis intended to offer a mobile-payment platform to
merchants for a smaller fee than mainstream issuers such as Visa and
MasterCard.253 If the ceiling for interchange fees were eliminated, issuers would increase the price for mobile payments, allowing startups
capable of pricing themselves below the market to enter.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Dodd–Frank Act was passed as the federal government’s attempt to reform the financial industry in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.254 It was a lofty piece of legislation with an admirable
intention: to prevent another similar crisis.255 The Act also included a
narrow amendment, known as the Durbin Amendment, which sought
only to reduce the fees that debit card issuers were charging
249. Id. In 2011, 44% of all reservation-taking North American restaurants used OpenTable,
and “12[%] of diners seated with reservations at any North American restaurant made those
arrangements through OpenTable.” Id.
250. Id. Ian Goldberg, vice president of Boka Restaurant Group, opined that “a lot of people
are going online and checking it out, and if they don’t see your restaurant, they might not go.”
Id.
251. This argument presupposes that price and convenience of obtaining the products are the
same across retailers. Obviously, if one retailer offers a sale on a particular product, consumers
may be willing to forgo whatever benefits they derive from the use of mobile payments in exchange for the lower price.
252. See Zywicki, supra note 47.
253. Id.
254. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
255. Murdock, supra note 19, at 1246.
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merchants per transaction.256 This Amendment was both applauded257 and abhorred by observers, who nervously predicted the
effects it would have on the banking industry.258 One of the Amendment’s unintended and unforeseen consequences, though, is the potential destruction of the budding mobile-payment industry.
The use and prominence of mobile payments continues to rise as
the technology becomes more available and convenient.259 Mobile
payments can take many forms; however, the true success of these
payments requires harmony between each institution contributing to a
transaction, rather than the exact method of mobile payment.260 To
be sure, the industry’s success is desirable because mobile payments
provide greater convenience, speed, and value to consumers and
merchants alike.261
Unfortunately, the Amendment’s restriction on interchange fees is
wreaking havoc on mobile payment’s potential success. The Amendment devalues the entire payment industry and redistributes its wealth
in a way that stifles innovation.262 Further, the Amendment has anticompetitive consequences in that it erects barriers that prevent startups from competing with established mobile-payment institutions.263
These consequences, however, need not be permanent. This Comment recommends that an exception be added to Dodd–Frank that
allows payments made by mobile devices to avoid the twenty-one cent
interchange cap. Allowing natural market forces to govern the industry will reverse the damage done by the Durbin Amendment and promote the growth of necessary technology.
Jonathon Reinisch*
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